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The landmark trilogy of United States Supreme Court juve-nile sentencing decisions over the last decade is wellknown. Starting with the Roper v. Simmons1 ruling in 2005
that abolished the death penalty for offenders under the age of
18, the Court has developed what might be called a “kids are
different” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The last three
years has seen the Court first outlaw life without parole sen-
tences for juvenile non-homicide offenders2 and then prohibit
the mandatory imposition of this sentence on any offender
under the age of 18.3
During this same time period, and utilizing a similar ratio-
nale, the high Court applied this “kids are different” approach
to its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence in the constitutional
consideration of custodial interrogations. In J.D.B. v. North
Carolina,4 the U.S. Supreme Court held that law enforcement
must consider a suspect’s age when weighing whether he is in
custody and entitled to Miranda warnings.5 The decision
marked a reversal of sorts, as only seven years earlier the Court
had rejected the proposition that clearly established U.S.
Supreme Court law required a consideration of age in the
Miranda custody calculus.6 In J.D.B., however, the Court saw
no need to “blind [itself] to the commonsense reality” that
children “will often feel bound to submit to police question-
ing.”7 It so held, in part, based on a concern about the “fright-
eningly high percentage of people” who confess to crimes that
“they never committed” as a result of the “inherently com-
pelling pressures” of custodial interrogation—a problem “all
the more troubling” and “acute,” the Court warned, when the
subject is a juvenile.8 Even the four dissenting justices did “not
dispute that many suspects who are under 18 will be more sus-
ceptible to police pressure than the average adult.”9
Scholars have remarked that the J.D.B. decision represents a
reinvigoration of the high Court’s jurisprudence of half a cen-
tury ago that required special protections for youth in the
interrogation room.10 Indeed, long-ago U.S. Supreme Court
decisions like Haley v. Ohio,11 Gallegos v. Colorado,12 and In re
Gault13 explicitly recognized the differences between youth
and adults in this context. While these cases are from another
era, J.D.B. has given renewed meaning to several oft-repeated
quotations from them, including: “[W]e cannot believe that a
lad of tender years is a match for the police [during custodial
interrogations],”14 and “[A]uthoritative opinion has cast for-
midable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘con-
fessions’ by children.”15
In light of J.D.B. and the revitalization of a “kids are differ-
ent” approach to custodial interrogations, this article high-
lights and examines issues that judges should carefully scruti-
nize when faced with a juvenile confession given as a result of
police questioning. These considerations include Miranda-
related issues, the confession’s voluntariness under a due-
process analysis, and the heightened risk of unreliable or false
confessions from youth. 
POLICE INTERROGATIONS, FALSE CONFESSIONS, AND
THE NEW JUVENILE JURISPRUDENCE
Before considering the particular issues faced by judges in
cases in which juveniles are interrogated, a brief synopsis of
some of the common, modern-day tactics used during custo-
dial interrogations is appropriate. Almost five decades ago, in
Miranda v. Arizona itself, the U.S. Supreme Court explained
that police interrogations entail “inherently compelling pres-
sures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist
and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do
so freely.”16 To elucidate the “heavy toll” of custodial interro-
gation, the Court cited several police interrogation training
manuals, including Fred E. Inbau and John E. Reid’s Criminal
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Interrogation and Confessions.17 Now in its fifth edition, Crimi-
nal Interrogation and Confessions promotes the Reid Tech-
nique—which to this day markets itself as “the most widely
used approach to question subjects in the world.”18
The Reid Technique teaches a nine-step interrogation
method that is used to extract confessions—a process that it
cautions should only be used when the police are confident the
suspect is responsible for the crime being investigated.19 At the
outset, interrogators are taught to isolate the suspect from fam-
ily or support. The interview then begins with a rapport-build-
ing period, during which investigators will often allow the sus-
pect to provide a narrative of his activities on the day of the
crime. After a short break, the investigator is trained to re-enter
the interrogation room and directly accuse the suspect of the
crime. During this period, the officer is taught to assert unwa-
vering confidence in the suspect’s guilt and discount any
claims of innocence asserted.20 The goal of this portion of the
interrogation is to make the suspect feel hopelessly trapped.
When this is accomplished, confession is offered as a “carrot”
to the suspect—in other words, as a way out of the suspect’s
predicament. Through a process scholars call minimization,
interrogators indicate that the benefits of confessing outweigh
the costs of maintaining innocence.21 They may ask a murder
suspect, for example, whether the murder was the unplanned
result of a moment of anger or an “accident”—which are, they
intimate, different from a premeditated murder (although it’s
never said how the two differ). Ultimately, if an interrogator
successfully obtains an admission of responsibility from the
suspect, he is taught to elicit a narrative and detailed version of
the criminal act.22
While no doubt effective in eliciting true confessions, the
U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that these interrogation
tactics can be so psychologically powerful as to elicit false con-
fessions at a “frighteningly” high rate.23 The false confession
first stems from law enforcement’s mischaracterization of an
innocent person as guilty and its decision to use these power-
ful tactics on that factually inno-
cent person.24 The “inherently
compelling pressures” described
above can then convince even an
innocent person to admit respon-
sibility.25 Ultimately, the resulting
false confession can often sound
convincing and detailed, particu-
larly if crime scene facts are made
known to the suspect through
media reports, local gossip, or,
most often, the inadvertent, sug-
gestive questioning of the inter-
rogator.26 From national reports like CBS’s 60 Minutes27 to
countless local newspaper articles, stories of false confes-
sions—and resulting wrongful convictions—have become
ubiquitous in the news cycle. 
Interrogators employ these and [other] psychologically
coercive tactics on even the youngest of suspects. While offi-
cers may generally recognize that juveniles are more vulnera-
ble or suggestible,28 in practice, many officers simply do not
alter their methods when interrogating a young suspect.29
Concrete examples abound. In the last few months alone, Ten-
nessee law enforcement officers were caught on tape threaten-
ing several teenage suspects with the death penalty—or a life-
time of prison rape—during interrogations.30 The appropriate-
ness of these tactics is highly debatable for any suspect, but it
is particularly difficult to stomach their use when the person
being questioned is only a teenager.
Due to juveniles’ “vulnerab[ility] or susceptib[ility] to . . .
outside pressures,”31 their “difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences,”32 and their “limited understandings of the
criminal justice system and the roles of the institutional actors
within it,”33 the J.D.B. court acknowledged what the research
supports: children and teenagers are particularly vulnerable
during custodial interrogations.34 And this country’s high
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Court is not alone in this con-
clusion: international treaties
such as Article 37 of the Con-
vention on the Rights of the
Child—and a “significant
number of [other] relevant
international law materials”—
demand that all minors receive
legal assistance before interro-
gation while in police custody
because of an increased risk of
coerced or false confession.35 Given this backdrop, it is essen-
tial that judges carefully scrutinize all aspects of a juvenile’s
confession. The sections below outline some of the particular
issues for consideration. 
PRETRIAL SUPPRESSION ISSUES
When dealing with a case involving a confession from a
juvenile, judges may face a variety of arguments from the
defense as to why the confession should be kept from the jury.
Given the evidentiary power of confession evidence, a judge’s
ruling on these pretrial motions might determine the entire
outcome of the case. Indeed, one leading legal evidence trea-
tise has remarked that “the introduction of a confession makes
the other aspects of a trial in court superfluous.”36 Examples
abound of innocent confessors being convicted even in light of
overwhelming evidence of innocence, such as seminal DNA
from a juvenile sexual assault and murder victim that excludes
the confessor.37
A confession must be suppressed where it is obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda v. Arizona or is otherwise involuntary. For a
statement to be admitted into evidence in compliance with
Miranda, a suspect must knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel when
subjected to a custodial interrogation.38 The voluntariness of a
confession is evaluated using a totality of the circumstances
test that considers both the individual vulnerabilities of the
suspect and law enforcement’s tactics in eliciting the confes-
sion.39 Each of these questions must be analyzed more rigor-
ously when the confessor is a juvenile. 
THE MIRANDA QUESTION: WHAT IS “CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION”?
Sometimes, a law enforcement officer will elicit a confession
from a juvenile without ever giving Miranda warnings at all,
reasoning that the warnings were not required because the
child was either not in custody or was not interrogated. The
custody inquiry asks courts to consider whether an objective
person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances.40
This custody question was at the forefront of J.D.B. In that
case, a 13-year-old seventh grader suspected of burglary was in
social studies class when an investigator arrived at the school
and informed administrators—including the assistant princi-
pal and a uniformed school resource officer—that he needed to
question the boy.41 The resource officer then went into the
social studies classroom and removed the student, taking him
into a closed-door room where he was met by the assistant
principal and the investigator.42 After some small talk, the
investigator, with aid from the assistant principal, questioned
the boy, leading him to confess to the burglaries.43 No Miranda
warnings were ever read.44
The admissibility of the schoolhouse confession became the
centerpiece of the litigation: three North Carolina courts
affirmed its admissibility by ruling that J.D.B. was not in cus-
tody at the time of the admissions while refusing to consider
the child’s age as part of the inquiry.45 The high Court, how-
ever, disagreed, reversing and ordering a reconsideration of the
custody determination to account for all relevant circum-
stances, including the suspect’s age.46
The import of a consideration of age in this custody calcu-
lus cannot be understated. The average young person likely
has no idea that he could ever, under any circumstances,
choose to terminate an encounter with a law enforcement offi-
cer. Kids are taught from birth to respect the authority of adults
and are punished when they don’t—even moreso when the
elder is a police officer. Unless he clearly understands his right
to do so, it is difficult to imagine any juvenile would ever com-
prehend that he could choose to simply ignore an officer’s
wishes to speak to him and unilaterally end the encounter. 
After J.D.B., judges must rigorously question any admis-
sion obtained by police without Miranda warnings regardless
of where, when, or how it was obtained. Traditional questions
regarding whether the suspect was handcuffed, or whether an
adult concerned with the welfare of the child was present,
remain important but may be secondary to the simple fact that
the suspect is a kid. Any Miranda-less confession at a school
is clearly problematic after J.D.B., as such a child would have
to muster not only the wherewithal to withstand the investi-
gator but also, in all likelihood, the orders of school adminis-
trators or resource officers to cooperate—all in an environ-
ment where students are prohibited from leaving their class-
room unless they have an adult’s permission.  Even police
“[A] judge’s ruling 
on... pretrial 
[suppression]
motions might
determine the
entire outcome 
of the case.”
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questioning of a young person in the living room of his own
home, with his mother by his side, raises the question of
whether a reasonable child has the practical ability to say to
the officer: “I don’t want to answer your questions and would
like you to leave.” 
The question of what constitutes an “interrogation” of a
juvenile suspect also deserves new attention after J.D.B. An
interrogation occurs when police should know that their
words or actions are likely to elicit an incriminating
response.47 Therefore, even if a suspect is in custody, any
Miranda-less confession he makes is admissible if it was not
made in response to an interrogation. Where an officer knows
he is dealing with a juvenile, the question becomes whether
words or actions that would not constitute an interrogation of
an adult suspect might when the person being questioned is a
juvenile. 
This very question is at issue in the Michigan case of People
v. White.48 Seventeen-year-old armed-robbery suspect Kadeem
White was taken into custody and given his Miranda warnings.
He asserted his right to remain silent. Shortly thereafter, the
officer said: “Okay. The only thing I can tell you is this, and I’m
not asking you any questions, I’m just telling you. I hope that
the gun is in a place where nobody can get a hold of it and
nobody else can get hurt by it, okay. All right.” Kadeem
responded with a brief admission that the State successfully
sought to introduce into evidence.49
While a five-judge panel of the Michigan Supreme Court
affirmed the admissibility of the statement, it did so over the
vigorous dissent of two justices. Citing J.D.B. and other
authority, Justice Kelly argued that the investigator “should
have recognized that defendant’s age made him especially sus-
ceptible to subtle compulsive efforts and that such conduct
would likely elicit an incriminating response.”50 Justice
Cavanaugh explained that Kadeem’s youth and inexperience
increased the likelihood that he would feel compelled to
respect the officer and perceive the officer’s statements as
requiring a response.51
Other cases are likely to arise where judges will be asked to
consider claims by law enforcement that officers’ words or
actions that led to statements by juveniles were not “interroga-
tions.” Whether the police words or actions took place without
Miranda warnings—or if they occurred after an invocation of
rights by the minor, as in White—J.D.B. suggests that there
may be a distinction regarding what constitutes an “interroga-
tion” when the suspect is a child as opposed to an adult. 
THE MIRANDA QUESTION:
WHAT IS A PROPER WAIVER
OF MIRANDA RIGHTS? 
The question of whether a
suspect knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waives his
Miranda rights is a separate
inquiry that is governed by a
“totality of the circumstances”
test that has long included con-
sideration of the suspect’s age.52
But after J.D.B.’s express concern
about the unique susceptibility
of youth during custodial interrogation, judges would be well
served to pay careful attention to the methods by which police
obtain waivers from juvenile suspects. 
Three decades ago, in a renowned study, psychologist
Thomas Grisso concluded that the majority of juveniles under
15 simply did not understand at least one of their Miranda
rights even when properly read to them.53 Even with the
increased repetition of Miranda warnings on television shows
and in pop culture, more recent studies have replicated these
findings.54 And so-called “juvenile Miranda warnings,” which
law enforcement often claims are simpler, more kid-friendly
warnings that ensure a proper waiver, generally use language
that still requires at least an eighth-grade level of comprehen-
sion, far above the intelligence level of many young confes-
sors.55
Consider the case of an 11-year-old Florida murder suspect,
who was administered Miranda warnings slowly and carefully
before his questioning and admission. Three experts, including
one retained by the State, all independently concluded that
despite these precautions, this boy simply could not under-
stand his rights.56 Or consider the case of a 12-year-old honor
roll student in Arkansas, who initially signed a Miranda waiver
and made a confession even though he later made clear that he
had no idea what the word “waiver” meant. When the law
enforcement officer misinformed the boy of the word’s mean-
ing, his confession was suppressed and the murder charges
eventually dropped.57 Even older juveniles, such as almost-17-
year-old Nga Truong, have given confessions that were later
suppressed despite properly read Miranda warnings when offi-
cers downplayed the rights’ significance.58
The lessons of these cases and the Grisso study is that for
certain juveniles, judges should consider starting with a pre-
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sumption that the suspect could
not properly waive his rights.
Only with particularized expert
evaluations to the contrary, or
other evidentiary facts that sug-
gest the child was either uniquely
able to understand his warnings
or that law enforcement officers
followed best practices and used
special precautions to guarantee
Miranda understanding, should
this presumption be rebutted.
Law enforcement best prac-
tices for Miranda have been recently modernized in a juvenile
interview and interrogation guide entitled Reducing Risks: An
Executive’s Guide to Effective Juvenile Interview and Interroga-
tion, developed by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police (“IACP”) in conjunction with the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Adjudication and the authors of this
article.59 The guide advises officers to “read each warning
slowly, stopping to ask the child after each individual warning
to explain it back in his or her own words.” The guide also
offers proposed language for administering the rights,60
including a requirement to inform young suspects of the pos-
sible adult criminal consequences of the crime. Judges should
be concerned when officers stray from these guidelines, espe-
cially for younger juveniles or those without prior law
enforcement experience. However, even for those juveniles
who do have significant previous interactions with police,
judges should carefully consider what that experience
entailed. So, for example, if a juvenile had prior interactions
with police for minor offenses—and these interactions
resulted in a confession followed by a diversion out of the
court system—this experience may have actually taught the
child that a confession would only help secure his release and
would not, in fact, “be used against him,” despite what he may
have been told.
To that end, judges should take to heart a true “totality of
the circumstances” approach when it comes to juvenile
waivers. A body of case law is developing that demonstrates
the importance of considering the entirety of the interroga-
tion, not just the admonitions and the waiver itself, when it
comes to this analysis. In Hart v. A.G.,61 for example, the inter-
rogator “went to great lengths” to explain the Miranda warn-
ings to the suspect; the confession was suppressed, however,
when the interrogator later told the suspect that “honesty
wouldn’t hurt him,” which the court recognized was incom-
patible with Miranda. Other videotaped interrogations have
shown investigators telling a suspect that “he is going to talk”
immediately before reading warnings that were supposedly
meant to relay to the suspect he had a right not to talk. 
The “kids are different” approach to custodial interrogation
also may call into question seemingly established U.S. Supreme
Court precedents like Davis v. U.S.62 and Berghuis v. Thomp-
kins.63 Those cases require suspects to unambiguously invoke
their rights to silence or an attorney. Both cases, however,
involve adult suspects, and recent categorical statements about
juveniles made by the high Court referencing their “limited
understanding[] of the criminal justice system and the roles of
the institutional actors within it”—not to mention the obvious
fact that many youth simply do not speak in such a clear or
assertive manner—are incompatible with rules that require
kids to make steadfast, savvy demands for counsel. Therefore,
if a juvenile says almost nothing for hours on end before fold-
ing under questioning—like 17-year-old Jonathan Doody64
did—or makes an equivocal request for counsel, judges may be
forced to grapple with whether Davis or Thompkins still applies
to a young confessor in a post-J.D.B. “kids are different” world.
The same may hold true when a juvenile asks for and is denied
the guidance of a trusted adult like a parent during interroga-
tion; Fare v. Michael C.,65 which held that a teenager’s request
to speak with his probation officer during interrogation was
not an invocation of Miranda, is now four decades old and
arguably obsolete in light of the high Court’s new juvenile
jurisprudence.
THE VOLUNTARINESS QUESTION: HOW TO CONSIDER
INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITIES AND QUESTIONABLE
TACTICS WITH KIDS
Separate and apart from Miranda questions, if there is coer-
cive police activity, due process requires the suppression of a
confession when the totality of circumstances, taking into
account the individual vulnerabilities of the suspect, renders
the confession involuntary.66 The recent juvenile jurisprudence
affects both the inquiry into individual vulnerabilities and
coercive police activity when it comes to young suspects.
As to the former, young age has always been considered a
vulnerability during interrogation, but the J.D.B. decision and
sentencing jurisprudence reinvigorates the fact that age is
more than a number. Even the four J.D.B. dissenters agreed
“[J]udges should
take to heart a
true ‘totality 
of the 
circumstances’
approach when
it comes to 
juvenile
waivers.”
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with the majority that all juveniles under 18 are “more sus-
ceptible to police pressure.”67 Indeed, so does law enforce-
ment, including the proprietors of the Reid Technique: They
explain that juveniles are more suggestible and advise inter-
rogators to exercise “extreme caution and care” when interro-
gating them.68 Judges should thus inquire as to what special
precautions officers took when questioning a youth. And it is
not adequate if the only special precautions taken amount to
securing the presence of a “youth officer” or obtaining
parental consent. Courts have recognized that a police officer
who is forced to alter roles and suddenly act in the best inter-
est of a child as a “youth officer” may be no more help than a
“potted plant.”69 At the same time, scholars have persuasively
argued that the presence of even a well-meaning parent can
actually add to the coercive nature of the interrogation for a
child.70
The question of whether certain police tactics are acceptable
for adult suspects yet too coercive for a child is perhaps the
more robust inquiry. To this end, judges should look to the
International Association of Chiefs of Police best-practices
guide described earlier. This executive police manual provides
a detailed account of how (and how not) to question juvenile
suspects, with special attention given to ensuring that police
do not draw faulty conclusions from common adolescent
behaviors, limiting juvenile questioning sessions to an hour
during the daytime, advising police to use only open-ended
questions, and instructing interrogators to refrain from making
even indirect suggestions of “help” in exchange for a confes-
sion.71 When officers stray from these guideposts, judges
should question their tactics. Judges also should be open to
hearing from an expert on police interrogations of juveniles as
they consider the police tactics used and the ultimate volun-
tariness of the confession. 
Additionally, judges should pay special attention to any use
of deception by police officers during an interrogation of a
youth. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested (in a
case involving a 20-year-old Marine) that interrogators are not
prohibited from using deception on suspects during question-
ing72—and the Reid Technique also allows interrogators to lie
as a last resort—even Reid draws a line at using this tactic with
children.73 If evidence surfaces that police used deceptive tac-
tics on the young suspect—whether it be false claims that
other witnesses have named him or even suggestions that the
consequences of confessing are less because of the suspect’s
youth—judges should pay
special heed and strongly
consider suppressing the
confession.
REASONABLE DOUBT
DESPITE A CONFESSION
J.D.B’s assertion that the
risk of false confession is “all
the more acute” with a juve-
nile suspect is well based in
research. The Court relied on
a brief submitted by the authors of this article as part of our
work with the Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth
(“CWCY”), wherein we pointed to a series of empirical and
laboratory studies that show juveniles falsely confess at a sig-
nificantly greater rate than adults.74 These confessions, more-
over, can be startlingly detailed. Nearly one-fifth of DNA exon-
erations, for example, include false confessions, and 95% of
those confessions included descriptive facts that seemingly
only the true perpetrator would know.75
Determining the reliability—or truth—of the actual confes-
sion in the context of bench trials should be done systemati-
cally and carefully.76 Judges should begin by closely examining
the confession itself to determine if it “fits” with the physical
evidence, other witness statements, and the State’s overall the-
ory of the crime. Every detail, big and small, should be scruti-
nized. For instance, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
recently ordered a new trial for 16-year-old confessor Daniel
Villegas, in part because his confession named co-perpetrators
whose participation was impossible because they were in cus-
tody at the time of the crime.77 In other questionable confes-
sions, however, even smaller details, such as the location in the
house of the crime, were inconsistent with the physical evi-
dence. In these cases, when faced with adjudicating the truth
of the confession, judges must force themselves to come up
with adequate answers to tough questions before convicting—
questions like, why would a true confessor be unable to accu-
rately relay facts about the crime scene? or, is there an ade-
quate explanation as to why the suspect would truly confess to
a heinous crime yet lie about mundane details such as the
exact location of the offense?    
After determining which facts do not “fit,” judges should
closely examine the accurate details. This process involves
“[W]hether certain
police tactics are
acceptable for
adult suspects yet
too coercive for 
a child is perhaps
the more robust
inquiry.”
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analyzing the confession for con-
tamination—or the disclosure of
crime scene facts to the suspect
before the confession. A confes-
sion can be contaminated by
neighborhood gossip, or, in more
high-profile cases, through media
reports. A judge should consider
(and allow into evidence) what
information was in the public
domain; if the confession only
contains details already known to
the general public, the confession
may prove little. The same holds true for accurate details that
could be explained through innocent knowledge: a young con-
fessor who was also the first person to come upon a dead body
and report it to police, for example, would be able to describe
the deceased’s clothes or body position even if he did not com-
mit the murder. 
By far the most common source of contamination, however,
comes from the interrogators themselves. During a pressure-
packed interrogation, police investigators may unintentionally
reveal crime scene facts to the suspect, despite training not to
do so. The improper use of leading or forced choice questions
enables the suspect to infer the answers the interrogator is
seeking. A suspect’s confession may also be contaminated if the
interrogator shows a suspect crime scene photos or takes him
to the location of the crime.
Finding this source of contamination can be done accu-
rately only when the interrogation is recorded in full. In such
a case, judges should examine the confession to determine if
the source of each detail truly and originally came from the
confessor or the interrogator.78 Some confessions literally
include no details that were not first proffered by the ques-
tioner, and appellate courts have placed the burden on the
State to prove a lack of contamination in order to uphold a
conviction based mostly on a confession.79 A highly contami-
nated confession is wholly unreliable. 
When the interrogation is unrecorded, an accurate evalua-
tion of the reliability of the confession is more difficult. At the
outset, however, given the national trend toward laws requiring
the electronic recording of custodial interrogations—a policy
recommended by the IACP and one that certainly benefits law
enforcement officers who are conducting legal and proper cus-
todial interrogations80—it is fair for judges to have a heightened
level of suspicion when the technology to record was available
yet not utilized by police. Appellate judges, including Chief
Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit, have articulated these sus-
picions when interrogations go unrecorded.81 Ultimately, the
failure to record the entire interrogation in such circumstances
should be given great weight in assessing both the admissibility
and reliability of the confession.82
But even without a recording, judges can examine the issue
of contamination by allowing into evidence police reports,
medical examinations, witness interviews, and any other infor-
mation that reveals what details the police knew before the
interrogation and the source of those details. Such evidence is
not hearsay because it is not being offered for the truth of the
facts known to police, only as evidence that the police knew
this information before the interrogation. If the only accurate
details in the final confession were already known by law
enforcement, this is, at least, circumstantial evidence of conta-
mination and an unreliable confession. 
Finally, in assessing a confession’s reliability, judges should
give great weight when confessors lead the police to accurate
information or evidence that they did not know at the time of
the interrogation. This kind of corroboration—the name of an
accomplice, the location of the murder weapon or the bloody
clothes, the fruits of an armed robbery—is what the Reid Tech-
nique refers to as “independent corroboration”83 and is the
most convincing evidence that a confession is true.
CONCLUSION
It can often be very difficult even for experienced and skep-
tical judges to recognize when a confession is problematic. In
his study of the first 40 proven false-confession cases amongst
those in which defendants were later exonerated by DNA evi-
dence, Professor Brandon Garrett found that in virtually every
case, judges denied defendants’ pretrial motions to suppress,
decisions which were then upheld by appellate courts.84 After
all, it is hard for even judges to imagine that anyone would
confess to a serious crime they did not commit. But the evi-
dence continues to grow that false confessions happen with a
level of frequency—especially in cases involving teenagers and
children—that demands close scrutiny from our judicial sys-
tem. It is the hope of the authors that this article will guide
judges in their efforts to scrutinize such cases, ultimately
ensuring both that juvenile confessions were lawfully obtained
and that they are reliable evidence of guilt. 
“It can often be
very difficult
even for 
experienced and
skeptical judges
to recognize
when a 
confession is
problematic.”
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